This is Part III of a three-part series examining the Trump Administration's Venezuela strategy. Part I established why the Western Hemisphere became a U.S. national security priority. Part II explained how that strategy translated into Operation Southern Spear and the military force posture now in the Caribbean.
In the early hours of January 3, 2026, the United States conducted military strikes across Venezuela and captured President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, transporting them to the USS Iwo Jima before transfer to face narcoterrorism charges in the Southern District of New York. Operation Absolute Resolve succeeded with no U.S. casualties or equipment losses.
For readers of this series, the question was never whether this would happen—it was when, and what would follow.
In a press conference today, President Trump provided the answer. Asked who would govern Venezuela, he stated simply: "We are going to run it." He clarified that the United States has no intention of executing this operation only to hand authority immediately to officials who may lack capacity or support. The U.S. will establish stability, begin reconstructing the oil industry, and only then identify Venezuelan leadership capable of assuming power.
This represents direct U.S. interim administration—not immediate transfer to Venezuelan opposition figures. It is a significant departure from recent interventions and raises profound questions about execution, timeline, and exit strategy.
What "Running It" Actually Means
The immediate challenge is translating Trump's statement into operational reality. Someone must issue orders that Venezuelan security forces, civil servants, utilities, ports, and financial institutions will obey. The model appears to be direct U.S. oversight of existing Venezuelan institutions, with American personnel providing decision-making authority until conditions permit transfer to credible Venezuelan governance.
This is not occupation in the traditional sense—it is temporary administration of a collapsed state. The distinction matters legally and politically, but only if "temporary" remains credible. Months of emergency stabilization may be defensible internationally; more than a year would constitute occupation and invite comparisons to Iraq.
The practical mechanics are complex. U.S. administrators will need Venezuelan faces and voices to issue directives. Ministries must continue functioning with largely the same personnel who served under Maduro, now under new direction. Security forces must receive orders from a chain of command that includes both U.S. and Venezuelan elements. The risk of confusion, resistance, or simple paralysis is substantial.
Trump's dismissal of opposition leader and Nobel Peace Prize winner María Corina Machado as lacking sufficient support reveals the administration's priorities: effectiveness over symbolism. While Machado has been the public face of Venezuelan opposition with claims to legitimacy from the disputed 2024 election, Trump appears unconvinced she can consolidate authority across Venezuela's fractured institutions. Whether this assessment is accurate, or becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy that undermines opposition unity, remains to be seen. Edmundo González, the opposition candidate widely recognized by his coalition, the U.S., and numerous governments as the legitimate winner of Venezuela's July 2024 presidential election, has remained relatively low-profile since Maduro's departure. His role, if any, also remains unclear.
Meanwhile, basic state functions must continue. Power grids, fuel distribution, ports, airports, hospitals, and food supply chains must be secured. If daily life collapses, public support evaporates and space opens for gangs, militias, or regime remnants to claim control.
Security presents the other immediate challenge. Weapons depots, prisons, intelligence archives, and key infrastructure must be secured. Street-level spoilers—colectivos (pro-regime militias), traffickers, gangs, and regime loyalists—must be deterred or neutralized before they can organize resistance. The balance is delicate: decisive enough to prevent violent opposition, restrained enough to avoid inflaming it.
This is where Joint Task Force Southern Spear matters most: not to occupy permanently, but to prevent fragmentation during the most volatile period while U.S. administrators establish authority.
The Next 180 Days: Building Toward Transfer
If the next few months are about establishing authority, the next six-to-twelve months are about building the conditions for transfer of power to Venezuelans.
U.S. administrators must balance accountability with pragmatism. Senior regime figures tied to trafficking, corruption, or violence will need to face justice. But attempting mass arrests often backfires, driving mid-level officials into sabotage or insurgency. Durable transitions typically use a tiered approach: clear accountability at the top, conditional cooperation for those who accept new authority, and deferred truth-and-justice mechanisms once stability exists.
Foreign influence must be addressed systematically. Cuban intelligence personnel, Russian and Iranian advisers, Hezbollah-linked networks, and Chinese economic interests embedded in the old regime present distinct challenges. Visible expulsions matter politically; dismantling covert networks matters practically. Managing Chinese infrastructure projects and debt obligations requires particular care—Beijing's economic footprint cannot simply be erased without consequences for Venezuela's recovery.
Economic normalization is the critical test. Venezuelans inside the country, and millions abroad, will judge this transition less by rhetoric than by results: safety, currency stability, jobs, and restored basic services. If U.S. administration can restart oil production and deploy revenues transparently, economic stabilization becomes achievable. If not, the transition stalls regardless of political arrangements.
Encouraging diaspora return requires more than hope. It requires credible property rights, anti-corruption enforcement, and access to global financial systems. U.S. administrators can create these conditions, but only Venezuelans can sustain them after transfer.
The U.S. must also identify and empower the Venezuelan leadership that will eventually assume authority. This cannot be imposed from outside, but neither can it emerge organically from institutions corrupted by decades of criminalized governance. The administration will need to balance legitimacy (figures with genuine support) against capacity (figures who can actually govern). The tension between these criteria may be irreconcilable, which is why Trump's timeline for transfer remains deliberately vague.
Finally, the United States will need to manage the global narrative. Critics will invoke Iraq's occupation and argue this is unlawful imperialism. The answer will not be rhetorical. It will rest on what follows: visible progress toward stability, transparency around decision-making, humanitarian access, meaningful Venezuelan participation in governance, and above all, a credible timeline for full transfer of authority.
What Success Requires
The removal of Maduro is only the opening act. What follows will determine whether this becomes a turning point or another entry in a long list of failed interventions.
The central question is no longer whether Venezuelan leadership can govern competently. It is whether U.S. administrators can govern competently on Venezuela's behalf, and whether they can build capacity for transfer without creating dependency or neo-colonial resentment.
Skepticism is warranted. The region has seen repeated interventions, ambitious promises, and outcomes that fall far short. Direct U.S. administration carries particular risks: it could work brilliantly if executed with competence and restraint, or catastrophically if it becomes extended occupation that fuels resistance and undermines the very legitimacy it seeks to create.
Success requires several conditions: First, rapid stabilization of daily life—Venezuelans must see immediate improvement in security and services. Second, transparency about U.S. decision-making and clear metrics for evaluating progress toward transfer. Third, meaningful inclusion of Venezuelan voices in administration, even before formal transfer. Fourth, sustained international support, particularly from regional partners. Fifth, and most critically, an exit strategy that is credible from day one.
The administration appears to understand that timeline matters enormously. Every week of U.S. administration that produces visible progress builds legitimacy; every week that produces confusion or stagnation erodes it. The difference between emergency stabilization and permanent occupation is measured not in declarations but in demonstrated progress toward transfer.
This is where competence matters more than ideology. Across Latin America, voters increasingly judge governments by outcomes rather than rhetoric. Whether Venezuela's transition succeeds will depend on whether U.S. administrators can restore order without repression, rebuild institutions without corruption, stabilize the economy without false promises, and, most importantly, transfer power to Venezuelans capable of sustaining what has been built.
The coming months will determine whether Venezuela experiences genuine reset or simply trades one form of foreign influence for another. That outcome matters far beyond its borders. For Venezuela, it is a chance to reclaim a deferred future. For the region, it is a test of whether the United States can successfully execute temporary administration and legitimate transfer. And for U.S. strategy, it is a reminder that enforcement is the easy part—what follows is what determines success or failure.
This three-part series has traced the arc from strategic diagnosis to operational enforcement to transition planning. The answer to whether this becomes a turning point will be written in the coming weeks—not by declarations of intent, but by the competence and restraint with which power is transferred, order is maintained, and governance is reestablished.
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