This is Part I of a three-part series examining the Trump Administration's Venezuela strategy. Part II explains how that strategy translated into Operation Southern Spear and the military force posture now in the Caribbean. Part III describes the issues of power transition following the removal of Nicolas Maduro from power.
For decades, U.S.
national security strategy treated the Western Hemisphere as largely settled
terrain. Serious threats were assumed to lie elsewhere—in Europe, the Middle
East, or Asia. Problems closer to home were treated as diplomatic, economic, or
law-enforcement matters rather than core security concerns.
That assumption no
longer holds.
The Evolution of a Strategy
This shift didn't emerge suddenly. It began during President Trump's first term, when senior officials openly revived the Monroe Doctrine as a statement of hemispheric responsibility, warned against the expansion of Chinese and Russian influence, recognized Juan Guaidó as Venezuela's legitimate leader, and imposed unprecedented economic pressure on the Maduro regime. What changed over time wasn't the diagnosis but the willingness to enforce consequences.During the years between Trump's administrations, the underlying problems intensified. Drug overdoses surged. Migration pressures mounted. Criminal networks became more deeply integrated with state actors. Foreign powers expanded their footholds in weak and corrupt states. By the time Trump returned to office, the costs of treating the hemisphere as a secondary concern were no longer abstract.
Why Now? The Numbers Tell the Story
The scale of the drug crisis alone explains the strategic shift. Among Americans ages 25–34, drug overdoses have become the leading cause of death—surpassing heart disease, cancer, suicide, and homicide.Put this in perspective: a comparable number of Americans have died from overdoses in just the past five years as U.S. military casualties in World War II, Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf War, and the War on Terror combined.
This is why the administration has reframed drug trafficking as a national security threat rather than a purely public-health or law-enforcement issue. Organized, transnational criminal systems are inflicting mass casualties on the United States. Treating that reality as peripheral is no longer defensible.
Venezuela: Where All the Problems
Converge
Within this
framework, Venezuela occupies a central position. It's not the only source of
drugs, migration, or instability, but it's where these challenges converge most
efficiently. Under Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela has become a permissive hub for
narcotics trafficking, a primary driver of regional migration, a petro-state
dependent on sanctions evasion, and a platform for Chinese, Russian, Iranian,
and Cuban influence. Pressure applied there affects multiple U.S. priorities
simultaneously.
Winners and Losers: The Strategic Reshuffling
This shift carries
consequences for allies and partners. Strategy is inherently about
prioritization, and prioritization produces winners and losers.
Canada faces a difficult recalibration. Some argue it should diversify its
trade and diplomatic relationships, including with China. Others warn that
doing so would directly conflict with U.S. strategic objectives. Geography and
economics leave Canada deeply linked to a neighbor moving in a new direction.
Europe is clearly less important relative to other regions under the new NSS.
Elements of the Trump Administration argue that Europe has enjoyed a strategic
free ride for decades and must now assume greater responsibility—not only for
its defense but also for preserving social and cultural cohesion strained by
misguided immigration policies.
In the Middle
East, the administration remains committed to advancing the Abraham
Accords, reducing Iranian influence, and promoting peaceful coexistence and
economic integration among regional partners. In Africa, the emphasis is
shifting away from open-ended aid toward investment, opportunity, and mutually
beneficial economic engagement.
The United States
isn't abandoning Europe, the Middle East, or Africa. But its approach to those
regions and the resources devoted to them will be reduced relative to those for
the Western Hemisphere.
The Bigger Question: Spheres of
Influence?
A larger, unresolved
question looms: how will China, Russia, and others interpret this shift? Will
they view it as a retreat from global leadership and a tacit division of the
world into spheres of influence? If the U.S. can declare an entire hemisphere its sphere of influence, can China do the same? Some believe this is precisely what President Trump
intends, but there is no definitive evidence of that. But if such a system
emerges, intentionally or otherwise, it would mark a fundamental change in the
post-Cold War international order.
Pentagon Restructuring: Strategy Meets
Structure
This
reprioritization is already evident within the Pentagon. The Department of War
is restructuring the combatant command system, reportedly reducing the number
of commands from eleven to eight. Plans include consolidating U.S. European,
Central, and Africa Commands into a new International Command and unifying
Northern and Southern Commands into a single Americas Command. The result would
be fewer four-star headquarters and a force posture more closely aligned with
hemispheric priorities.
What Matters: Strategy, Not Tactics
Whether this
strategy succeeds will depend on execution and endurance across
administrations. But the strategic diagnosis is hard to dispute. The United
States is no longer insulated from instability in its own hemisphere. The
Western Hemisphere is no longer optional terrain. It is strategic ground.
Predictably, much
media and congressional attention has focused on tactical events—most notably
the killing of two men aboard a drug-running vessel. The use of lethal force
warrants review, and there are established military mechanisms to conduct it.
But these incidents shouldn't eclipse the larger issue: a historic shift in
national strategy.
That shift should be
front and center in public debate. Instead, it's often overshadowed by
sensational imagery and partisan reflexes. Congress, in particular, has largely
abdicated its role in shaping strategy, instead serving as a rubber stamp for
whichever political team is in power.
Some in Congress now object on constitutional grounds, citing Congress's authority to declare
war. In theory, they're correct. In practice, Congress has long since
surrendered that role, allowing presidents of both parties to conduct military
operations worldwide with tacit consent. If Congress wishes to reclaim its
authority, it should debate the strategy—approve it, reject it, or amend it—not
feign outrage over enforcement actions to score political points.
The Debate We Should Be Having
This is a major
shift in American national security strategy. Citizens and their
representatives should debate it seriously—not the tactics, but the strategy
itself. The first step in that process is understanding what is happening.
I hope this post
contributes, in a small way, to that effort.
Read Part II, From Strategy to Enforcement: What the U.S. Is Doing in the Caribbean where I examine how this strategic shift is now being translated into concrete military and enforcement actions in the Caribbean.
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You mentioned Chile, Honduras, El Salvador potentially aligning with this reorientation. It would be good to hear something happening other than revolutions in these countries. Maybe my history is weak, but the mass migration to USA from the south tells me things below our border still aren’t good. Are there any rising star countries in Central or South America? People could make conclusions with the press that has been released about Argentina, but others, not so much.
ReplyDeleteThank you for this excellent question. Your skepticism is understandable, and in some respects warranted. Latin America has a long history of political swings, fragile coalitions, and reform efforts that fade once economic pressure or public fatigue sets in. No one should assume a durable, region-wide ideological realignment simply because a few elections break in one direction.
DeleteMy point is more limited—and more conditional—than that.
What appears to be changing is not ideology so much as tolerance for failure. In several countries, voters are reacting less to abstract left-right debates and more to lived outcomes: persistent crime, economic stagnation, mass emigration, and state capture by criminal networks. Argentina’s turn under Milei, El Salvador’s embrace of Bukele’s hard-line security policies, and growing fatigue in places like Chile and Honduras are less about conservative philosophy than about rejecting models that have clearly not worked.
Whether these shifts endure depends heavily on results. If governments that emphasize order, enforcement, and economic normalization can deliver measurable improvements—safer streets, stabilizing currencies, reduced out-migration—then political realignment becomes self-reinforcing. If they fail, voters will move again, as they always have.
This is where U.S. policy matters. A sustained Western Hemisphere strategy that rewards cooperation, enforces consequences for criminalized regimes, and reduces external meddling can shape incentives over time. But it cannot substitute for domestic governance. Reorientation is possible; it is not guaranteed. It will be earned through performance, not declarations.
In short, pessimism about inevitable outcomes is reasonable. Dismissing the possibility of meaningful change, however, assumes that conditions, incentives, and leadership no longer matter. History, especially in moments of regional crisis, suggests otherwise.