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Coincidence?

Over the past few weeks, disruptions have affected several critical American systems, including FAA flight operations, banking services, Microsoft platforms, and—most troublingly—the National Security Agency's classified communications network, NSANet, which was reportedly impaired for nearly four days.

Officials have attributed these incidents to unrelated technical failures, maintenance issues, and software problems. Some journalists and members of Congress have questioned those explanations, but key questions remain: What failed? Why did recovery take so long? And what evidence supports the conclusion that the events were unrelated? Officials may be right, but their explanations still deserve serious scrutiny.

My skepticism is grounded in experience. As a U.S. Naval Intelligence Officer, I worked in classified environments that intersected with NSA operations extensively. Later, as the founder and CEO of a regional fiber-optic telecommunications company, I leased dedicated wavelengths of light to a federal agency for classified communications. The agency insisted on controlling the optical layer itself to prevent intermediaries from accessing its transmissions.

I was also a Microsoft Certified Network Engineer and served as Chief Information Officer for a public school system and a college. I designed and built networks and ensured essential services stayed operational.

Consider updating a school email server. We planned for possible failures by preserving system images and backups, establishing recovery procedures, and scheduling changes late at night, often with a technical specialist on hand. If an update failed, we needed to restore service quickly. Even a one-hour outage during the school day was unacceptable. That was a school email system. We are now told that software maintenance disrupted the NSA's classified communications network for days.

NSANet is far more complex, and classified systems pose unusual recovery challenges. But complexity makes testing, redundancy, change management, and recovery planning even more important. Was the update tested? Were redundant systems affected? Why couldn't it be reversed or restored from backups? Those are ordinary questions for any network administrator, let alone the NSA.

During this period, President Trump also dismissed National Cyber Director Sean Cairncross. The timing does not establish a link to the outages, but it raises questions about whether his removal was related to the failures or to information that has not been publicly disclosed.

I raised concerns about America's infrastructure vulnerabilities twelve years ago. In my December 19, 2014, Liberty Takes Effort article, A Disappointing Press Corps, I criticized reporters for focusing on a Sony Pictures hack without asking President Obama about the broader threat. I described Sony as “reflective of a much broader vulnerability in private and government networks” and asked whether attacks on our electrical grid, communications, and financial systems might constitute an existential national-security threat.

Just months earlier, hackers had breached JPMorgan Chase, compromising information linked to 76 million households and seven million small businesses. The intrusion came after the United States imposed sanctions over Russia's actions in Ukraine and Crimea, prompting investigators to consider whether it might have been retaliation by Moscow. The FBI said it had found no evidence of such a connection, and subsequent investigations identified a criminal enterprise. Still, identifying criminals does not necessarily rule out state interests, and the lack of publicly disclosed evidence cannot resolve every intelligence question. Iran had also carried out disruptive cyberattacks against American banks earlier in the decade.

My concern goes back even further. In 1999, while serving as Intelligence Officer for the Navy's Strategic Studies Group, I led an intelligence Red Team in a war game involving a rising Asian power. As American forces deployed to the theater, I responded as the adversary by disabling the West Coast electrical grid. The lesson was simple: an opponent unable to match America's conventional military strength might instead target the infrastructure that supports our economy, military, and population.

Today, Russia, Iran, and China have reason to study these vulnerabilities. Temporary, deniable disruptions could serve as strategic warnings without triggering a conventional confrontation. I am not claiming this happened; I am arguing that the possibility warrants investigation rather than reflexive dismissal.

What troubles me is the lack of sustained, detailed questioning. If a software update caused the NSANet disruption, investigators should document the software, its authorization and testing, the personnel or contractors involved, the sequence of failures, and the corrective action taken. If criminals were responsible, investigators should pursue the evidence and prosecute where warranted. If foreign governments were involved, they should provide an appropriate account of the threat and response. These questions are becoming more urgent as our critical infrastructure ages and artificial intelligence gives potential adversaries increasingly sophisticated tools to exploit its vulnerabilities.

Classified systems require secrecy—I know that from experience. But secrecy need not prevent congressional oversight, independent technical review by cleared experts, or a meaningful public explanation.

Even if every incident was accidental, adversaries have seen how failures can disrupt essential American systems. That is hardly reassuring. Twelve years after I issued my warning, our reliance on interconnected infrastructure has only grown.

Americans deserve more than assurances from the government—they deserve answers. The press has a responsibility to demand them.

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