The Strait of Hormuz: Secure the Present, Build a Different Future

In the late 1980s, I worked at the Office of Naval Intelligence, supporting U.S. naval operations in the Persian Gulf. One of those operations was Earnest Will, the largest convoy escort mission since World War II. American warships protected reflagged Kuwaiti tankers from Iranian mines and small-boat attacks. Despite those threats, the operation succeeded. The Strait remained open, and Iran ultimately backed down.

That success, however, masked a larger failure. We solved the immediate problem but left the underlying one intact. Iran retained the ability to threaten the strait, and the world remained dependent on it. Four decades later, we are paying the price.

Today, the Strait of Hormuz is effectively closed again. Commercial shipping has fallen by more than 90 percent, and millions of barrels of oil per day have been removed from the market. Prices have surged past $100 a barrel, and economies that depend heavily on Gulf energy, particularly in Asia, are scrambling to adjust. This was not an unforeseen development; it was the predictable result of a vulnerability that was never addressed.

After talks collapsed in Pakistan this past weekend, President Trump ordered a naval blockade of Iranian ports and coastal facilities. U.S. forces are beginning mine-clearing operations, and the objective is straightforward: reopen the strait and restore oil flow. That objective is necessary, but it does not resolve the broader problem that made this crisis possible.

There are three levels to solving this problem: winning the current fight, changing the security model, and reducing dependence on the strait. The United States is now engaged in the first, and the blockade is the appropriate short-term response. The global economy cannot absorb a prolonged disruption of this scale, and restoring freedom of navigation is essential.

Winning the Current Fight

Following the collapse of talks in Pakistan, President Trump ordered a naval blockade of Iranian ports and coastal facilities. U.S. forces are beginning mine-clearing operations, with the stated objective of reopening the strait and restoring oil flow. That objective is necessary, but the method reflects a more deliberate shift in strategy.

This is not a traditional blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. The United States is not attempting to shut down the waterway or restrict global commerce. Instead, it is taking a more targeted, strategically effective approach. Transit through the strait to and from non-Iranian ports is being protected, while vessels entering or exiting Iranian ports are being interdicted. That distinction matters.

Iran’s strategy has been to impose costs on the global economy by threatening a shared chokepoint, betting that the resulting disruption would force outside powers to restrain the U.S. or push for concessions. The U.S. response turns that logic on its head. Rather than allowing Iran to hold the broader market hostage, the blockade isolates Iran economically while preserving the flow of energy to the rest of the world.

In practical terms, this creates a powerful asymmetry. Gulf oil producers can resume exports under U.S. naval protection, stabilizing global supply and easing upward price pressure. Iran, by contrast, finds its exports effectively cut off. Its ability to generate oil revenue, already constrained by sanctions, is further reduced to near zero. At the same time, sustaining imports of refined products, industrial goods, and critical materials becomes increasingly difficult amid interdiction. This is economic pressure applied with precision.

It also alters the diplomatic equation. Countries that depend on Gulf energy—particularly in Asia—have a strong interest in seeing the strait reopened and kept open. If the United States can secure transit for those flows while isolating Iran, the burden of disruption shifts from the global economy to Tehran. That is where China enters the picture.

China is the Gulf's biggest oil importer and has longstanding ties with Iran to ensure access to discounted energy. Nonetheless, China’s main priority is stability, not chaos. An extended crisis that jeopardizes regional supply chains, raises shipping dangers, and causes price swings would harm China's interests. With a key summit between President Xi and President Trump upcoming in May, China might urge Iran to resolve the conflict swiftly.

If Iranian exports are effectively shut down while other Gulf producers resume normal operations, China faces a choice. It can continue to support Iran diplomatically, at the cost of ongoing instability, or it can use its leverage to push Tehran toward a negotiated outcome that restores market predictability.

The U.S. blockade is designed to force that choice.

By protecting global flows while isolating the actor responsible for disruption, the United States shifts the center of gravity. Iran no longer holds the primary leverage. Instead, it becomes the party under pressure—economically constrained, diplomatically exposed, and increasingly dependent on outside support that may not be sustainable under prolonged stress.

This does not guarantee a quick resolution. It will take several days, if not longer, to position U.S. naval forces to execute the mission. The mission itself carries risks, including attacks upon U.S. ships, as occurred in the 1980s, escalation, and the challenge of sustained enforcement. But it represents a clear attempt to move from a reactive posture to one that selectively imposes costs and reshapes the incentives of all parties involved.

Changing the Security Model

A more sustainable approach to preventing a recurrence of Iranian belligerence begins with a shift in responsibility once the blockade is in place. The countries with the greatest stake in keeping the strait open are the Gulf states and the major energy importers in Asia. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, and others depend on the strait for economic survival, while China, India, Japan, and South Korea rely on it for energy security. Yet the long-term burden of maintaining open access has largely fallen to the United States.

That imbalance should be addressed through a more formal multinational framework. Building on existing cooperative structures, a Gulf-led maritime security arrangement, supported by the United States, European partners, and major Asian economies, would better align responsibility with interest. Such a framework would not eliminate risk, but it would distribute the burden more effectively and enhance the legitimacy and durability of the effort.

Legal clarity should emphasize that this framework is firm. The Strait of Hormuz, as an international waterway governed by established law, cannot be obstructed by any nation. While this principle is generally acknowledged, enforcement remains inconsistent. Persistent diplomatic, economic, and military pressure can increase the consequences of defiance and reinforce compliance with this standard.

At first glance, the countries most directly affected by a disruption in the Strait of Hormuz are the Gulf states and the major energy importers in Asia. That is where most of the oil flows, and those are the economies most visibly exposed.

But that view overlooks a more important reality. Oil is a global commodity, and its price is set in a global market. It does not matter whether a barrel is shipped to China, India, or Europe. When supply is disrupted at scale anywhere, prices adjust everywhere.

A loss of several million barrels per day from the Gulf does not remain confined to the region. It tightens global supply, drives up prices, and forces every consuming nation to compete for a smaller pool of energy. The result is higher fuel costs, increased transportation expenses, and broader inflationary pressure across economies that may not import a single barrel directly from the Persian Gulf.

This is why disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz have historically had global economic consequences. The impact is not regional. It is systemic.

That reality also explains why responsibility for securing the strait cannot rest solely with the countries that depend on it. Asian economies have the most immediate exposure, so it is reasonable for them to contribute more directly to maritime security. But Europe and the United States have a clear and enduring interest as well.

The issue is not merely access to Gulf oil. It is the stability of the global energy market and the principle of free navigation through international waterways. If a regional power can successfully threaten a critical chokepoint and impose costs on the global economy, that model will not remain confined to the Persian Gulf. It will be studied, adapted, and applied elsewhere.

Ensuring that international waterways remain open is therefore not an act of regional support. It is a core function of maintaining a stable global economic system.

These measures can stabilize the current situation, but they do not address the core issue. The underlying vulnerability is structural, and resolving it requires reducing global dependence on the strait.

Reducing Dependence on the Strait

A specific, measurable goal could be to reduce reliance on Persian Gulf oil by 50% by 2035. Previously, around 20 million barrels per day flowed through the strait, representing a large portion of global consumption. Such a volume meant that any disturbance could cause immediate and widespread impacts. Cutting that amount to roughly 10 million barrels daily would significantly alter the risk landscape, making potential disruptions easier to handle and less likely to cause instability.

Achieving that outcome requires progress across several areas. Expanding bypass infrastructure is the most direct step. Existing pipelines in Saudi Arabia and the UAE already allow some oil production to bypass the strait, and additional capacity could be developed over time. While the investment required is substantial, it is small relative to the economic damage caused by repeated disruptions.

Increasing production outside the Gulf is equally important. Growth in the United States, Brazil, Guyana, Canada, and Argentina has already shown that significant supply can come from regions not exposed to this chokepoint. Supporting continued development in these areas reduces risk concentration and limits the leverage of any single region.

Reducing demand pressure also plays a role. Over time, shifts in transportation, efficiency gains, and the gradual adoption of alternative technologies can lower global oil demand. Expanding nuclear energy can further stabilize the broader energy system by reducing reliance on other fossil fuels and easing pressure on hydrocarbon markets.

None of these steps offers a quick solution, and each requires sustained commitment. However, they rely on existing technologies and known capabilities rather than on speculative breakthroughs.

This crisis has clarified both the problem and the available solutions. The world remains highly dependent on a single chokepoint vulnerable to disruption by a regional power, but the tools to reduce that dependence are already in place.

The blockade will likely succeed in reopening the strait, and when it does, there will be a natural tendency to treat that outcome as a resolution. History suggests that would be a mistake. The events of the late 1980s show that restoring access without addressing underlying vulnerabilities merely defers the problem.

Energy security is not a one-time achievement but an ongoing structural challenge. The current crisis offers an opportunity to move beyond temporary fixes and pursue a more durable solution.

The path forward is clear. Secure the present through military action where necessary, build a more balanced and cooperative security framework, and reduce dependence on the strait over time. Whether this moment becomes a turning point or a missed opportunity will depend on whether those steps are taken after the immediate crisis passes.

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