The recently announced Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Iran has produced sharply different reactions. Supporters describe it as a historic diplomatic breakthrough that could lead to a broader peace in the Middle East. Critics view it as a dangerous concession that rewards Iran while obtaining little in return.
After reading the text of the MOU, I believe both sides may be
overstating their case.
The agreement is not a peace treaty. It is not a final settlement. It is
essentially a sixty-day ceasefire and negotiating framework. The war has
paused, certain actions will occur immediately, and the most difficult issues
have been deferred to further negotiations. Whether this agreement is
remembered as a turning point or merely another pause in a long-running
conflict will depend almost entirely on what happens during the next sixty
days.
Before discussing the agreement itself, it is worth considering what the
war actually accomplished.
The military campaign clearly degraded Iranian capabilities. Nuclear facilities were damaged. Military infrastructure was struck. Iranian vulnerabilities were exposed in ways that few observers anticipated. Yet the war did not overthrow the regime, eliminate Iran's influence in the region, or permanently resolve the nuclear issue. The conflict reduced a threat, but it did not remove it.
Israeli strategists have sometimes described this type of operation as
"mowing the grass" or "cutting the lawn." The phrase is not
particularly elegant, but it captures an important strategic reality. Some
threats can be managed, weakened, and periodically reduced without being
permanently eliminated. Military force can destroy facilities, degrade
capabilities, and impose costs. What it often cannot do is transform the
political and ideological motivations that created those capabilities in the
first place.
That distinction matters because it shapes how we should evaluate the
MOU.
The agreement clearly delivers some immediate benefits to both sides. The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz restores the flow of oil and reduces pressure on the global economy. That is no small matter. Every major economy has an interest in avoiding prolonged disruption in one of the world's most important energy corridors. The agreement also provides a mechanism for reducing the immediate risk of further military escalation while negotiators attempt to address the underlying disputes. Beyond those immediate benefits, however, the agreement becomes more controversial.
The MOU contemplates sanctions relief, access to frozen Iranian assets,
the restoration of oil exports, and a substantial economic development
framework. By contrast, the central objectives of the United States remain
largely unresolved. The agreement does not require the immediate dismantlement
of enrichment facilities. It does not prohibit future enrichment activities. It
contains no restrictions on missile development and no provisions addressing
Iranian support for regional proxy organizations such as Hezbollah, Hamas, or
the Houthis.
Iran reiterates that it does not seek nuclear weapons, a position its
leaders have publicly maintained for years. The more difficult questions
surrounding enrichment, stockpiles, verification, missile programs, and
regional activities are deferred to future negotiations.
This does not mean the agreement is destined to fail. It simply means
that the most difficult issues remain unsettled.
Supporters of the MOU argue that economic opportunity may encourage a
different Iranian path. They suggest that greater integration into the global
economy could strengthen those within Iran who prefer prosperity over
confrontation. Such an outcome is certainly possible. History occasionally
surprises us. Political systems sometimes evolve in unexpected ways, and
diplomatic breakthroughs occasionally emerge from circumstances that appear
hopeless. At the same time, strategy should not be built entirely upon
optimism.
For nearly half a century, the Islamic Republic has repeatedly
demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice economic opportunity in pursuit of religious, ideological, political, and regional objectives. That history does not prove
that change is impossible, but it does suggest caution. The burden of proof
rests with Tehran. If Iran intends to pursue a fundamentally different course,
it will have every opportunity to demonstrate that during the coming
negotiations. The more important question may be what happens if it does not.
One lesson from my time supporting U.S. naval operations in the Persian
Gulf during the late 1980s is that tactical success and strategic success are
not the same thing. During Operation Earnest Will, the United States
successfully protected shipping and kept the Strait of Hormuz open. The
operation worked. Yet the larger vulnerability remained. Iran retained the
ability to threaten the strait, and the world remained heavily dependent upon
it. Four decades later, we are still dealing with the consequences of that
unfinished work. The same lesson applies today.
Much of the current discussion focuses on whether Iran will change. That
is certainly important. But it is not the only variable that matters. The
United States, Israel, the Gulf states, and other partners also have choices.
They are not passive observers waiting to discover whether Iran becomes a
different country.
The enemy gets a vote, but so do we.
Even if Iran continues its present course, there are steps that can
reduce its leverage and limit its ability to threaten the region and the global
economy. Gulf producers can continue expanding pipeline infrastructure that
bypasses the Strait of Hormuz. Energy markets can diversify supply sources.
Regional security cooperation can deepen. Economic pressure can be maintained.
Intelligence cooperation can expand. The objective should be to create a
strategic environment in which Iranian threats become less disruptive and less
effective over time.
In that sense, the long-term goal is not necessarily regime change. It is
strategic change. The objective is to reduce the risks posed by Iranian
behavior regardless of who governs in Tehran.
The Partners Problem
There is another challenge that receives far less attention than Iran's
nuclear program or the details of the MOU itself. Even the most successful
long-term strategy toward Iran depends on willing and capable partners, and
maintaining those partnerships may prove more difficult than many Americans
realize.
Americans often view the Middle East through the lens of military power,
economic output, or oil production. Those factors matter, but demographics and
geography matter as well. Iran is a nation of roughly ninety million people
with a long history, a strong national identity, significant industrial
capacity, and a highly educated population. Its leaders often make poor
decisions, but it would be a mistake to underestimate the country itself.
The Gulf monarchies present a very different picture. They possess
enormous financial resources and increasingly sophisticated military
capabilities, but most govern comparatively small populations. Their leaders
must constantly balance external security concerns with internal political
stability. Unlike the United States, they do not have the luxury of changing
administrations every four years and rethinking their foreign policy. They live
in a difficult neighborhood and must plan decades into the future. That
reality creates a perspective that is often poorly understood in Washington.
The United States sees Iran as a problem to be managed. The Gulf states
see Iran as a permanent neighbor. Regardless of who occupies the White House or
who governs in Tehran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait,
Qatar, and Oman will still be sharing the same region with Iran fifty years
from now.
As a result, they frequently pursue strategies that appear contradictory
to outside observers. They seek American military protection while maintaining
diplomatic channels with Tehran. They purchase advanced weapons while exploring
opportunities to reduce tensions. They oppose Iranian influence while
simultaneously looking for ways to coexist with it. From their
perspective, this is not inconsistency. It is prudence.
The tendency to hedge has been reinforced by the inconsistency of
American policy. Over the past two decades, regional leaders have witnessed
dramatic shifts in Washington's approach. One administration emphasizes
engagement with Iran. Another emphasizes maximum pressure. One administration
places strong emphasis on traditional regional alliances. Another signals a
desire to reduce American involvement in the region altogether.
Whether one agrees or disagrees with those policy shifts is less
important than the message they send. Leaders in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi cannot
assume that the policy of any particular American administration will survive
the next election. As a result, they naturally seek additional ways to protect
their interests.
The recent war may alter some of those calculations. For years, several
Gulf states attempted to reduce tensions with Iran while simultaneously
strengthening their military capabilities. That approach was understandable if
one believed accommodation could reduce the risk of conflict. Iran's actions
during this war may cause some leaders to reassess that assumption.
It is entirely possible that two very different futures are being
discussed quietly during the sixty-day negotiation period. One future assumes
Iran chooses a different path and gradually reintegrates into the regional and
global economy. The other assumes that little changes and that the region must
prepare for a continuation of the strategic competition that has defined the
last four decades.
Rational governments prepare for both.
In that context, the Abraham Accords may prove just as important as the
negotiations themselves. If Iran demonstrates a genuine willingness to alter
its strategic direction, regional integration could expand in multiple
directions. If it does not, the same relationships developed through the
Accords could evolve into a more formal framework for intelligence sharing,
missile defense cooperation, maritime security, economic coordination, and
diplomatic pressure.
The question may not be whether the Abraham Accords expand, but why they
expand.
Should the negotiations fail, sanctions are likely to return, investment
promises will evaporate, and many of the economic benefits envisioned in the
MOU will never materialize. In that scenario, the region could emerge from this
crisis more aligned against Iran than it was before the war began. Ironically,
a conflict that Tehran may view as a demonstration of resistance could
ultimately produce the very coalition it has long sought to prevent.
Israel faces a related challenge. Although the U.S.-Israeli relationship
remains extraordinarily strong, Israeli leaders cannot ignore changes in
American public opinion. Support for Israel remains substantial, but
anti-Israel sentiment has grown on portions of both the political left and
right. Israeli planners are almost certainly asking themselves the same
question being asked elsewhere in the region: How reliable will American
support be twenty years from now?
This does not mean America's partnerships are collapsing. It does mean
that our partners are behaving like rational actors. They are evaluating risks,
considering alternatives, and preparing for multiple futures.
That matters because containment strategies are not sustained by military
power alone. They require confidence, predictability, and a network of partners
who believe their interests remain aligned.
Beyond the Next
Sixty Days
The next sixty days will tell us much about Iran's intentions. They
should also tell us something about our own.
If Iran ultimately agrees to meaningful restrictions on enrichment, accepts robust verification, limits missile development, and reduces support for regional proxy organizations, this agreement could become the foundation for a broader and more stable regional order. Such an outcome would deserve recognition as a significant diplomatic achievement. If not, the strategic challenge will continue.
The good news is that failure of the negotiations would not leave the United States and its partners without options. The same steps that improve regional security under a successful agreement also improve regional security under a failed one. Expanded energy infrastructure, stronger regional cooperation, improved missile defenses, deeper intelligence sharing, and more integrated security arrangements all reduce the leverage available to Iran regardless of its future choices. That is the larger lesson of this conflict.
The purpose of strategy is not simply to cut the lawn when it grows too
high. The purpose is to make it grow back more slowly each time. If military
action ever becomes necessary again to degrade Iranian nuclear or missile
capabilities, it should occur in a strategic environment where Iran's options
are fewer, regional partnerships are stronger, and the global economy is less
vulnerable to disruption.
For now, the MOU deserves neither celebration nor condemnation. It
deserves careful observation. It has created an opportunity. Whether it becomes
a genuine turning point or merely another pause in a long-running conflict will
depend not on the words contained in the agreement, but on the actions that
follow.
The real question is not simply whether Iran is prepared to change. It is
whether the United States and its partners are prepared to learn from the last
forty years and build a strategy that succeeds whether Iran changes or not.
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